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NOTES
Control,8 the court, quoting from American Jurisprudence,9 said:
"'The legislature has no power, under the guise of police regula-
tions, arbitrarily to invade the personal rights and liberty of the
individual citizen, to interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations,
or to invade property rights'." If the court felt that fundamental
rights were being invaded under Article 74 as amended, as it
seems they did feel, they should have invalidated the law on
those grounds.
William J. Doran
LOUISIANA PRAcTIcE-RES JUDICATA-MASTER AND SERVANT
Plaintiff sued the state, after its waiver of immunity, to re-
cover damages for the death of her husband. Her claim was
based solely upon the alleged negligence of the state's employees.
In a suit previously instituted against the employees on the same
cause of action, the employees had been declared free of fault and
judgment had been rendered accordingly. In the present pro-
ceedings, the state interposed the exception of res judicata, based
upon the judgment in favor of the employees rendered in the
prior suit. Held, exception sustained. The Supreme Court has
made an exception to the Civil Code requirement of identity of
parties for invoking res judicata, and this case falls within the ex-
ception. McKnight v. State, 68 So.2d 652 (La. App. 1953).
The Supreme Court decision relied on by the court of appeal
is Muntz v. Algiers.' In that case, plaintiff had sued defendant
railway company's lessee for the death of his child, and the lessee
had been found innocent of fault. In a contemporaneous action
in a different court against defendant railway company as the
vicariously liable lessor, plaintiff relied entirely on the alleged
negligence of defendant's lessee. Defendant's exception of res
judicata, founded on the judgment exonerating the lessee ren-
dered while the suit against the defendant lessor was pending,
was sustained. Article 2286 of the Civil Code, from which the
Louisiana principles of res judicata emanate, was not mentioned
in the court's opinion.
8. 216 La. 148, 172, 43 So.2d 248, 256 (1949).
9. 11 AM. JUR. 1078, § 303 (1937).
1. Muntz v. Algiers & G. St. Ry., 116 La. 236, 40 So. 688 (1906).
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Article 2286 provides: "The authority of the thing adjudged
takes place only with respect to what was the object of the judg-
ment. The thing demanded must be the same; the demand must
be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be
between the same parties, and formed by them against each other
in the same quality." (Italics supplied.) Certainly the language
of the article is clear and seems to admit of no exception. On
the basis of the same requirement of identity of parties in the
French archetype of Article 2286, French commentators who have
considered the question presented in the instant case and Muntz
v. Algiers believe that the authority of the thing adjudged would
not avail the defendant in the second suit under French law.2
It is therefore submitted that the decisions in the present case
and Muntz v. Algiers cannot be supported by the basic Code pro-
vision. Assuming arguendo that the courts were authorized to
make an exception to the requirements of the article, is the rule
so established sound? This discussion contemplates a fact situa-
tion involving the completely vicarious liability of one party for
the alleged fault of another who is also liable. For convenience,
these parties will be designated "master" and "servant," indicat-
ing the context to which the discussion is most pertinent.
The rule of the present case is the rule at common law.8
Commenting on its formulation in the Restatement of Judg-
ments,4 the American Law Institute presents and attempts to
answer some of the questions raised by its application. Most
striking is the apparent unfairness of making an adverse judg-
ment in a suit against the servant a complete bar to a suit against
the master without, conversely, making a favorable judgment in
the first suit binding on the master as well as the servant. The
Institute dismisses this absence of mutuality as unimportant
when the plaintiff has had his day in court with an opportunity
to present his full case. There hardly seems to be the force in the
circumstance of plaintiff's having had a day in court that would
vindicate the partiality of the rule. In practice, it gives the master
two opportunities to escape liability, one by assisting in the
servant's defense and another by conducting his own. On the
2. LALOU, TRAITI§ PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSAILITt ClmE 623, no 1084 (4th ed.
1949); 2 SOURDAT, TRAITA GftNARAL DE LA RESPONSABILITA OU DE L'AcTIoN EN DoM-
MAGES-INT]RETS EN DEHORS DES CONTRATS 37, no 798 (6th ed. 1911). Diligent
search disclosed no instance of the presentation of this question to a French
court.
3. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 96, 99 (1942).
4. Id. at 473.
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other hand, the plaintiff who loses his suit against the servant
loses all. If he is successful, the common law does accord his
judgment against the servant the force of a rebuttable presump-
tion in his suit against the master;5 but the fact remains that the
master is not bound. Plaintiff ordinarily can protect himself by
joining master and servant as parties defendant. But in cases
like the present one, where an attempt to make the state a party
defendant prior to its waiver of immunity would be a vain
gesture, plaintiff is powerless to avoid the effects of the rule.
Nor can he sidestep it in cases like Muntz v. Algiers, where the
parties defendant are not amenable to suit in the same court.
Interests other than the plaintiff's are to be considered, how-
ever. "If the State has afforded an opportunity to the parties to
litigate their claims and a final judgment has been rendered, it is
to the public interest that they should not be permitted to reliti-
gate the same matters."6 At the root of this interest is what one
French writer has called the dogma of the judge's infallibility.7
Successive contrary judgments on the same questions of law and
fact would tend to lower the station of the courts in the public
mind. This danger appears in bold relief in fact situations like the
ones in question. The master may recover from the servant that
which he has been condemned to pay a third party who has
suffered damage as a consequence of the servant's fault." Suppose
that, in a suit against the servant alone, he has been declared
free from blame; and, in a subsequent suit against the master,
the master has been held liable to the injured plaintiff on the
basis of the servant's fault. This would be possible under the rule
proposed by plaintiff in the instant case. The fallibility of the
courts would be dramatically displayed in the master's suit
against the servant for indemnification. The servant would have
a judgment pronouncing him innocent of any fault and the master
would have a pronouncement of equal dignity to the contrary.
The effect of this anomaly on the layman's respect for the law
and the courts is not difficult to imagine. Moreover, judgment in
favor of the servant in the master's suit would be unfair to the
master; and judgment for the master would in effect permit
5. Id. at 481.
6. Id. at 9.
7. 2 MAZEAUD, TRAITi§ THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITh CIVILE
DLICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 603, no 1730 (4th ed. 1949).
8. Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539
(1922); Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917); Costa v. Yochim,
104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900); American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Gulf States
Utilities Co., 4 So.2d 628 (La. App. 1941).
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the plaintiff to recover from the servant indirectly, via the master,
that which a court had decided he could not recover directly.
It is upon this latter consideration that the decision in Muntz v.
Algiers was based. These bizarre results are avoided by the
application of the rule of both the common law and the present
case, that a judgment in favor of the servant on the merits is a
bar to a subsequent action against the master. But then the
injustice to the plaintiff previously discussed is encountered.
It is submitted that Article 2286 does not represent the legis-
lature's choice of horns in this dilemma. It is unlikely that the
pioblem was foreseen at all by the redactors. Article 2320 indi-
cates that the redactors expected the master's responsibility for
his servant's torts to arise only when some fault was imputable
to him." If this effect were given the article, the problem of the
instant case would never arise, for the suit against the master
would be predicated on the master's fault, which would not have
been adjudicated in a suit against the servant based upon the
servant's fault. For this reason, Article 2286 tannot realistically
be said to apply to the problem at hand. The court in Muntz v.
Algiers did not expressly attempt to make an exception to Article
2286 in arriving at its decision. Although the case was presented
by way of an exception of res judicata, the article was not men-
tioned in the court's opinion proper. The decision was based upon
the court's assumption that a judgment against the lessor would
entitle him to indemnification from the lessee, despite the lessee's
acquittal of fault in the previous suit, and that it would be grossly
unfair to let the plaintiff collect from the lessee indirectly what
a court had finally decided the lessee did not owe him. It could
have been based as well on the contrary assumption that the
lessor would not have been entitled to recoupment from the
lessee, who had been absolved of responsibility to the plaintiff,
and that judgment against the master would have been, for
that reason, an injustice to him. If this had been the basis of the
decision in Muntz v. Algiers, authority to support it would seem
to be available. Article 3061, in the title of the Civil Code on sure-
tyship, provides that "The surety is discharged when by the act
of the creditor, the subrogation to his rights, mortgages and
privileges can no longer be operated in favor of the surety."
9. Art. 2320, LA. CVIL. CODI of 1870: "Masters and employers are answer-
able for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the exer-
cise of the functions in which they are employed. . . . In the above cases,
responsibility only attaches, when the masters or employers . . . might have
prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it."
[VOL. XIV
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The analogical application of this provision would have been
nothing unusual in a civilian jurisdiction, where, traditionally,
code provisions are held in high regard and applied generously to
factual contexts not within the strict purview of their terms.'0
Such an application of Article 3061 in the instant case and Muntz
v. Algiers would have led to the result which the court thought
desirable without exposing the court to suspicion that it disre-
garded the plain letter of the law.
It is therefore submitted that the instant case and the enig-
matic decision in Muntz v. Algiers do not reach wrong results.
Both can be justified, not as making an exception to Article 2286,
which admits of no exception and is of doubtful application, but
as reaching the result which the legislature dictated in the
analogous situation contemplated by Article 3061. Although the
rule they established is, as suggested above, unfair to plaintiffs,
this unfairness can be offset by according a judgment obtained
against the servant considerable weight as evidence of the serv-
ant's fault in the subsequent suit against the master." If this
were done, the added risk to which the master would be exposed,
that the plaintiff would seek to obtain a judgment against the
servant collusively, should serve to deprive plaintiffs of cause to
complain of the rule.
Donald J. Tate
LOUISIANA PRACTICF,-SPLITTING CAUSES OF ACTION
Plaintiff filed suit to recover for property damage sustained
in an automobile collision and, prior to trial, filed a second suit
against the same defendants for personal injuries arising from
the same accident. Trial of the property damage suit resulted in
a judgment for plaintiff, which was paid by defendants within a
few days. At that time a release was executed, signed only by
plaintiff, which recited:
"[T]his release shall in no way affect [plaintiff's] claim for
injuries . . . asserted against [defendants] in a second suit
now pending in the [same court]. The release herein granted
10. See Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role o Article 21, 9 TULANE
L. REV. 485, 501 (1935); Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification
and Legal Method for State and Nation, 17 TULANE L. REV. 351, 390 (1943).
11. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS 481 (1942).
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